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WRONGFUL DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURIES-
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND
COUNTERCLAIMS
ROBERT L. WILLS*
By its enactment of Amended House Bill No. 80, effective Sep-
tember 22, 1955, the 101st Ohio General Assembly has made important
changes in the law with respect to the procedure in actions brought by
administrators and executors for wrongful death and for personal in-
juries. These changes relate to (1) joinder of causes of action and (2)
counterclaims. The changes are purely procedural. The bill makes no
change in the substantive principles applicable to such actions, and does
not alter the present distinctions between them. The bill does not change
the law of res judicata applicable to judgments in such actions. The dis-
cussion of the 1955 legislative changes and their significance will be
preceded by a statement of the pre-existing law.
PRE-EXISTING LAW
In Ohio, a cause of action for personal injuries survives the death
of the victim by virtue of Section 2305.21 of the Ohio Revised Code.
1
Such a cause of action includes the elements of pain and suffering, loss of
earnings during the lifetime of the injured person, and medical expenses
incurred by him. After his death, an action upon such a cause of action
is brought by his personal representative, and the proceeds of any re-
covery become part of his estate, subject to the claims of his creditors,
and to the provisions of his will. This cause of action is sometimes re-
ferred to as the "survivor cause of action."
At common law, the next of kin of a deceased person had no cause
of action for their damages resulting from his death, against the tort-
feasor who had wrongfully caused his death. In England, the cause of
action for wrongful death was created by the Fatal Accidents Act of
1846, usually known as Lord Campbell's Act.' In Ohio, a cause of
action for wrongful death is created by Section 2125.01, et seq., Ohio
*Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1"§2305.21 (11235) Surjival of actions.
In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law,
causes of action for mesne profits, or injuries to the person or property,
or for deceit or fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable
thereto."
At common law, the injured person, during his lifetime, had a cause of
action for his personal injuries. §2305.21 therefore did not create the cause of
action; it merely provided for its survival.
In Am. H. B. No. 80, because of a typographical error, §2309.16 twice in-
correctly refers to §2505.21 as the survival statute. §2309.05 and 2309.06 correctly
refer to §2305.21.
2 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
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Revised Code.3 Procedurally, the action for wrongful death must be
brought by the personal representative of the decedent, but the action is
for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and other
next of kin of the decedent 4 The proceeds of any recovery in an action
for wrongful death do not become part of the decedent's estate. There-
fore, the proceeds are not available to the creditors of the decedent, and
their distribution is unaffected by the provisions of his will.
Ohio law has maintained a sharp distinction between the surviving
cause of action for personal injuries and the cause of action for wrongful
death. This distinction has been made in several different situations.
Thus, although an injured person can release his cause of action
for personal injuries, he cannot release the cause of action of his next
of kin for his prospective wrongful death.5
A recovery by a personal representative in an action for personal
injuries is not a bar to an action for wrongful death against the same-
defendant by the same personal representative.6 A judgment in favor of
the defendant in an action by a personal representative for personal
injuries is not a bar to an action for wrongful death by the same personal
representative against the same defendant." Likewise, a judgment in
favor of the defendant in an action brought by the decedent during his
lifetime for his personal injuries is not a bar to an action by his personal
3 Thus the wrongful death statute, §2125.01 et seq., differs from the survival
statute, §2305.21, which merely provides for the survival of the decedent's cause of
action for personal injuries. See note 1, supra. §§2309.05, 2309.06 and 2309.16,
as amended by Am. H. B. No. 80, recognize this distinction between the survival
statute and the wrongful death statute.
4 "While the machinery of the action in the one case is the same as the
machinery in the other, the death action is an action given expressly by the
statute, and the rights which give rise to the two actions are entirely different."
May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St. 110, 115, 165 N.E. 576, 64 A.L.R. 441
(1929).
5 Maguire v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 14 O.C.C. (N.S.) 431, 23 O.C.D. 24
(1911), affirmed 'without opinion, 87 Ohio St. 511, 102 N.E. 1121 (1913); Phillips
v. Community Traction Co., 46 Ohio App. 483, 189 N.E. 444 (1933), motion to
certify overruled, Dec. 13, 1933; Note, "Falid release executed prior to death
not a bar to wrongful death action in Ohio;" 6 Cmn. L. Rav. 212 (1932).
Pilkington v. Saas, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (1937), recognized the rule, but
held thai a release executed during decedent's lifetime by his mother, who was
his sole next of kin, constituted a bar to an action for his wrongful death. The
case is noted in 5 OHIO ST. L. J. 122 (1938).
Traci, Law and Logic: Conflict in Ohio's Wrongful Death Statute, 4 CLEME-
LAND-MARSHALL L. Rev. 38, 53 (1955), states that the Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in In Re Minor of Tony Mantarro and Sophia S. Mantarro,
Guardianship, No. 487485, approved the settlement of an infant beneficiary's claim
during the lifetime of the injured person. The author also states that at least one
court in Ohio has refused to approve such a settlement on the ground that it has
no authority to do so.
6 Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601
(1908). The converse would also be true.
7 May Coal Co. v. Robinette, supra, note 4. The converse would also be true.
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representative for his wrongful death against the same defendant.'
The two-year statute of limitations on a cause of action for per-
sonal injuries, Section 2305.10, begins to run from the date of the injury,
whereas Section 2125.02 provides that an action for wrongful death must
be commenced within two years after the death of the deceased person.9
The "Dead Man Statute" 10 apparently prevents the defendant's
testifying in an action by a personal representative for personal injuries
suffered by his decedent,11 but by its express terms it permits the de-
fendant to testify in an action for wrongful death.
On principle, it would seem that statements by a decedent incon-
sistent with the position of his personal representative should be admissible
as an admission in an action for his personal injuries by his personal repre-
sentative, but not in an action for his wrongful death.1 " However, it
would also seem, on principle, that statements of a decedent, of a dis-
serving nature, should be admissible even in an action for wrongful death,
as a declaration against interest."3
In an action for wrongful death, brought by the personal repre-
sentative of a decedent who was killed in a collision between decedent's
automobile and that of the defendant, it was held that the defendant
could not properly assert a counterclaim for his own personal injuries
sustained in the collision.14
8 DeHart, Admx., v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62, 85 N.E. 2d 586
(1948).
9 Thus, in DeHart, Admx. v. Ohio Fuel Gas. Co., supra, note 8, the decedent
suffered his injuries on August 4, 1930. He died February 12, 1942. On April 2,
1942, his administratrix commenced an action for his wrongful death. It was held
that the action was commenced in time.
10 "§2317.03 (11495) Cases in 'which a party shall not testify. A party
shall not testify when the adverse party is . . . an executor or administrator ....
This section does not apply to actions for causing death ... "
11 Cox v. Waltz, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 364 (1932). An administrator sued for
injuries received by his decedent when she was struck by an automobile being
operated by the defendant. The decedent died from other causes. It was held that
the trial court properly excluded the testimony of the defendant, under the Dead
Man Statute. It is not clear whether the court attached significance to the fact
that decedent did not die as a result of the accident.
12 The personal representative is the successor in interest of his decedent
in an action for personal injuries, but not in an action for wrongful death.
13 In Fielder v. Ohio Edison Co., 158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E. 2d 855, 35
A.L.R. 2d 1365 (1952), there is a dictum on p. 387 to the effect that ". . . decla-
rations against interest by a decedent are admissible in a survivor action, whereas
they are not so admissible in a wrongful death action." Presumably by "decla-
rations against interest" the court meant "admissions."
The distinction between the admissions of a party-opponent and the ex-
ception to the hearsay rule for declarations against interest is discussed in
4 Wia htoa, EvmcNce §1049, 5 WIGMORE, EVMENeF §1455 et seq. (3d ed. 194-0).
An extensive discussion of the Ohio cases may be found in a Comment by Robert
E. McGinnis, Admissions "Against Interest" in Ohio, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1954).
1 4 Epinger, Admx., v. Wade, 142 Ohio St. 460, 52 N.E. 2d 852 (1944). As
will be pointed out infra, the rule established by this case has been changed by
Am. H. B. No. 80.
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A personal representative's cause of action for personal injuries
suffered by his decedent could not be joined with a cause of action for the
wrongful death of the decedent. 5
AMENDMENTS RELATING TO JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
The decision in the Fielder case called attention to the question
of the desirability of the Ohio rule denying the personal representative
of a decedent the right to join the cause of action for personal injuries
with the cause of action for wrongful death."8 It is probable that separate
actions for wrongful death and for personal injuries had frequently been
tried together by consent,17 and that such causes of action had frequently
been joined without objection by the defendant. Although a joint trial
of the two causes of action requires the submission of more complex issues
to the jury, and may create problems as to admissibility of evidence,' S
it has two great advantages: (1) the delay and expense of two suits is
avoided, and (2) the possibility of inconsistent verdicts is reduced. The
Fielder case made it clear that a defendant could prevent a joint trial of
the two causes of action by interposing a demurrer for misjoinder of
causes of action if the plaintiff attempted to join them, or by refusing to
agree to a joint trial if separate actions had been filed in the same court.
Legislation permitting joinder of the two causes of action was
proposed by the Ohio State Bar Association.' 9 House Bill No. 80, em-
bodying the proposal, was introduced by Representative Joseph E. Lady
of Hardin County. It was sponsored in the Senate by Senator Fred L.
Hoffman of Hamilton County. After passage of the bill by the House,
an amendment relative to counterclaims, which will be discussed infra,
was effected in the Senate. The House subsequently concurred in the
Senate amendment, and the bill was approved by the Governor.
The majority opinion in the Fielder case had held that the two
causes of action could not be joined because both causes of action do not
affect all the parties to the action as required -by Section 11307, Ohio
General Code, now Ohio Revised Code Section 2309.06. Inasmuch as
15 Fielder v. Ohio Edison Co., supra, note 13. The Fielder case was noted
in 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 88 (1954). As will be pointed out iifra, the rule established
by the Fielder case has been changed by Am. H. B. No. 80.
16The dissenting opinion of Weyga~dt, C.J., in the Fielder case, pointed
out the desirability of a joint trial of the two causes of action. The dissenting
opinion of Taft, J., took the position that the interpretation of the joinder statutes
by the majority was incorrect. The majority opinion was widely criticized in the
law reviews.
17 See, e.g., Lopresti v. Community Traction Co., 160 Ohio St. 480, 117
N.E. 2d 2 (1954).
18 See supra, text accompanying notes 10-13.
19Report of the Judicial Administration and Legal Reform Committee of
the Ohio State Bar Association, 27 OHIO BAR 794-, at 800 (October 25, 1954). The
writer was a member of the subcommittee concerned with this problem.
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the majority opinion in the Fielder case was based upon Section 2309.06, °
Amended House Bill No. 80 added a proviso to that Section, to the effect
that the Section shall not prevent a joinder of a cause of action for
wrongful death with a cause or causes of action 2' for injuries to the
person or property, or both, of the decedent.22
The amendment of Section 2309.06 probably would have been
sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the bill, since the decision in the
Fielder case, as previously indicated, was based upon that Section. The
majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions in the Fielder case
apparently assumed that joinder of the two causes of action would have
been permitted by the basic joinder statute, Section 11306, Ohio General
Code, now Section 2309.05, Ohio Revised Code, in the absence of the
requirement in the following section that the causes of action joined must
affect all the parties to the action.23 However, to avoid any possible
question, the basic joinder statute, Section 2309.05, was amended by the
addition of a new paragraph "K," which affirmatively authorizes joinder
of a cause of action for wrongful death with a cause or causes of action
24
for injury to the person or property, or both, of the decedent.2 3
As a result of the amendment of Sections 2309.05 and 2309.06 by
20 Ohio Gen. Code Section 11307 provided:
"The causes of action so united must not require different places of trial, and,
except as otherwise provided, must affect all the parties to the action." (Italics
added.)
The language of Ohio Rev. Code Section 2309.06, when originally enacted in 1953,
was the same in substance.
21 In Ohio, contrary to the majority rule, injuries to the person and property
of the plaintiff resulting from the same tortious act of the defendant constitute two
causes of action. Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E. 2d 707, 166
A.L.R. 855 (1945). The language of Am. H. B. No. 80 recognizes and conforms
to the Ohio rule.
2 2 The full text of §2309.06, with the 1955 proviso in italics, is as follows:
§2309.06. The causes of action united as provided in section
2309.05 of the Revised Code must not require different places of trial,
and, except as otherwise provided, must affect all the parties to the
action; provided, that this section shall not Prevent a joinder by an
executor or administrator of a cause of action for the wrongful death
of his decedent under sections 2125.01 to 2125.04, inclusive, of the
Revised Code, with a cause or causes of action for injuries to the
person or property, or both, of his decedent, surviving under section
230521 of the Revised Code, when both or all of such causes arise out
of the same wrongful act or acts.
23 Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of Weygandt, C.J.,
refer to the "same transaction" clause (now paragraph A), and the "transactions
connected with the same subject for action" clause (now paragraph B).
24 See note 21, supra.
25 The full text of paragraph "K" is as follows:
(K) Claims by an executor or administrator for the wrongful
death of his decedent under sections 2125.01 to 2125.04, inclusive,
of the Revised Code, and for injuries to the person or property, or
both, of his decedent, surviving under section 2305.21 of the Revised
Code, when both claims arise out of the same wrongful act or acts.
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Amended House Bill No. 80, it is now permissible for a personal repre-
sentative of a decedent to join a cause of action for the wrongful death
of his decedent with a cause or causes of action for personal injury or
property damage, or both, on behalf of his decedent. It is not mandatory
that he do so; he may still file separate actions against the defendant
on the respective causes of action.2" If he files separate actions in the
same court, and the separate actions are pending at the same time, the
defendant may now properly move that the actions be consolidated,
under Section 2309.64," as the causes of action may now be joined. If
separate actions are filed, and if they are never consolidated, the judg-
ment in one case will not have the effect of res judicata on the other;
Amended House Bill No. 80 does not change this principle.2"
If the personal representative does choose to avail himself of the
privilege of joinder which is now afforded by Amended House Bill No.
80, the causes of action should be separately stated and consecutively
numbered, pursuant to Section 2309.07.2"
As pointed out previously,30 the defendant may testify in -an action
against him for wrongful death, but probably may not testify in an action
against him by a personal representative for personal injuries suffered by
the latter's decedent. Therefore, since Amended House Bill No. 80 does
not purport to change the rules of evidence, and does not purport to
change the nature of the respective causes of action, the defendant's
testimony may be admitted as to the wrongful death cause of action, but
excluded as to the personal injuries cause of action, when the two causes
of action are tried together. This would necessitate an instruction to the
jury (at least if requested by the plaintiff) to consider the defendant's
testimony only as to the wrongful death cause of action.3
1
26 One possible motive for filing separate actions is that In an action on the
surviving cause of action for personal injuries, the Dead Man Statute would
prevent the defendant from testifying. See note 10, supra.
27 "Ohio Rev. Code Section 2309.64 (11369). Consolidating actions.
When two or more actions are pending in the same court, on
motion and notice to the adverse party, the defendant may require
him to show why they should not be consolidated. If it appears that,
at the time the motion is made, the actions could have been joined,
and if the court finds that they ought to be joined, they shall be
consolidated. (Italics added.)
28 See text accompanying note 7,. supra.
29 Ohio Rev. Code Section 2309.07 (11308). Each cause to be numbered.
"When a petition contains more than one cause of action, each
cause must be separately stated and consecutively numbered."
30 Supra, text accompanying note 10.
31 The effectiveness of such an instruction may be open to question.
The principle of multiple idmissibility of evidence is discussed in 1 WIGMORE,
EvrDENCE §13 (3rd ed. 1940).
A similar problem may arise in the trial of cases in which a counterclaim
is asserted. This is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 49 and 50.
Experience under the new procedure may indicate the desirability of amend-
ing the Dead Man Statute.
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In most cases, a disserving out-of-court statement by a decedent
would be admissible as to the personal injuries cause of action as an
admission, and would also be admissible as to the wrongful death cause
of action as a declaration against interest.2 If an exceptional situation
should arise in which such a statement is admissible only as to one of the
two causes of action, a similar instruction to the jury would be necessary.
Separate forms of verdict should be submitted to the jury on the
respective causes of action, so that it will be clear how much, if anything,
was awarded by the jury on each cause of action.33 For the same reason,
the judgment entry should clearly specify the amount of recovery, if any,
on each cause of action.
A principal objective of permitting joinder of a cause of action for
wrongful death and a cause of action for personal injuries suffered by
the decedent was the avoidance of inconsistent judgments.3 4 It may
reasonably be anticipated that when the two causes of action are tried
together, and damages on both causes of action are established, the jury
will ordinarily make consistent determinations of liability. That is, the
jury will either find in favor of the plaintiff on both causes of action,
or find in favor of the defendant on both causes of action. In some cases
a jury may be justified in finding in favor of the plaintiff on one cause
of action, and in favor of the defendant on the other cause of action.
3 5
If, in a particular case in which two such causes of action are being
tried together, an attorney fears that the jury may make inconsistent
determinations of liability, and that the evidence does not justify incon-
sistent determinations, he may consider the use of a special verdict or
special interrogatories. 
6
It may also be reasonably anticipated that a jury with both causes
of action (personal injuries and wrongful death) before it will have a
better understanding of the scope of the respective causes of action than
a jury with only one of the causes of action before it. A jury, in an action
for wrongful death only, may not understand the reason for the absence
of any mention of medical expenses, loss of earnings, etc.
32 See text accompanying notes 12 and 13, supra.
33 The difference between the disposition of the proceeds of an action for
wrongful death, and the disposition of the proceeds of an action for injury to
the person or property of the decedent, is discussed supra, text preceding note 2.
34 See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
35 Thus, if only a short period of time elapsed between injury and death,
and the jury is not convinced that the injured person suffered any pain, it may
return a verdict in favor of the defendant on the cause of action for personal
injuries, solely because of the failure of proof of damages on that cause of action.
If the court has instructed the jury to consider the testimony of the defendant
only on the wrongful death cause of action, it may be justified for this reason in
returning a verdict in favor of the defendant on the wrongful death cause of
action, and in favor of the plaintiff on the personal injuries cause of action.
36 The decision as to the use of a special verdict or special interrogatories
often involves a difficult problem of trial tactics.
1956]
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AMENDMENT RELATING TO COUNTERCLAIMS
As stated previously, the Ohio Supreme Court had held that in an
action by a personal representative of a decedent for the wrongful death
of the decedent, the defendant could not properly assert a counterclaim
against the personal representative for his own personal injuries sustained
in the same collision.a7 The court gave as its reason that "there is no
mutuality between the claim of the plaintiff for the wrongful death of
her decedent and the claim of the defendant for her personal injuries.""8
The defendant could, of course, bring a separate action as plaintiff
against the personal representative as defendant. However, the filing
of such a separate action would result in two lawsuits instead of one.
Furthermore, inconsistent judgments might result.3" The opinion in the
Epinger case recognized that in an action by a personal representative
to recover for personal injuries suffered by his decedent, the defendant
might properly assert a counterclaim arising out of the transaction set
forth in the petition as the foundation of the claim of the personal
representative.4 0
As originally recommended by the Ohio State Bar Association, and
as introduced and passed by the House, Amended House Bill No. 80 was
confined solely to the matter of joinder of causes of action, and amended
only Sections 2309.05 and 2309.06. However, the bill was amended in
the Senate so that it also amended Section 2309.16, the basic counter-
claim statute, -by the addition of a new third paragraph. 41 The new
paragraph expressly authorizes the defendant in a wrongful death action
to assert as a counterclaim a cause of action against the estate of the
decedent arising out of the transaction which is the foundation of
plaintiff's wrongful death claim. Thus the new paragraph abrogates the
rule established by the Epinger case.
3 7 Epinger v. Wade, supra, note 14.
38 Epinger v. Wade, supra, note 14, at page 463.
a9 That is, in an action by a personal representative for the wrongful death
of his decedent against defendant X, the jury might find that defendant X was
negligent, and that the decedent was not contributorily negligent, and thus return
a verdict in favor of the personal representative, whereas in a separate action
brought by X as plaintiff against the personal representative -as defendant, the
jury might find that the decedent was negligent and that X was not contributorily
negligent, and thus return a verdict in favor of plaintiff X against the personal
representative.
40 "Of course, if plaintiff's action had been one for the benefit of decedent's
estate to recover for personal injuries suffered by the decedent in his lifetime,
there could be little question as to the right of the defendant to assert her counter-
claim by way of cross-petition in this action. Under such circumstances, there
would be mutuality of parties as well as mutuality of claims." Epinger v. Wade,
supra, note 14, at page 464.
41 The full text of Section 2309.16, with the paragraph added in 1955 in
italics, is as follows:
Sec. 2309.16. A counterclaim is a cause of action existing in
favor of one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs or
one or more defendants, or both, between whom a several judgment
[Vol. 16
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In general, the phraseology of the new third paragraph of Section
2309.16 follows the pattern of the first paragraph, which is the general
counterclaim provision. However, there is one exception. The third
paragraph omits the phrase, "or arising out of contract," which is em-
ployed in the first paragraph. This phrase was deliberately omitted in the
bill, as it was thought that undue prejudice might result from the trial
of an unrelated contract counterclaim in an action for wrongful death.
Thus a cause of action in favor of the defendant in a wrongful death
action does not qualify as a proper counterclaim against the personal
representative simply because it arises out of contract.
42
As is true of counterclaims generally in Ohio practice, the counter-
claims authorized by the new third paragraph of Section 2309.16 are
permissive, and not compulsory. That is, a defendant is not required to
assert his cause of action as a counterclaim, and may instead assert it in
a subsequent independent action. Ohio has not adopted the concept of
the compulsory counterclaim, which is embodied in Rule 13 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Ohio, the only penalty for failure
to assert a cause of action as a counterclaim is that he cannot recover
costs in a subsequent independent action on the cause of action.
might be had in the action, and arising out of the contract or trans-
action set forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's
claim, or connected with the subject of the action or arising out of
contract or ascertained by the decision of a court.
Such counterclaim shall not be limited to the amount claimed by
the plaintiff or defendant against whom such counterclaim is asserted.
In an action by an executor or administrator upon a cause of
action for the 'wrongful death of his decedent under sections 2125.01
to 2125.01, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or upon a cause of action
for injuries to the person of his decedent, surviving under section
2505.21 of the Revised Code, or upon a cause of action for injuries
to the property of his decedent, surviving under section 2505.21 of
the Revised Code, or in an action by an executor or administrator in
'which two or more of such causes of action are joined, a defendant
may assert as a counterclaim a cause of action existing in favor of
such defendant against such executor or administrator in his capacity
as representative of the estate of his decedent, and arising out of the
transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's
claim, or connected 'with the subject of the action or ascertained by
the decision of a court.
42 It may be questioned whether the danger of an unrelated contract counter-
claim is any greater in a wrongful death action than in any other kind of action.
Little if any use has been made of the contract provision in the first paragraph. It
has been in the counterclaim statute since 1947, and no case has come to the writer's
attention in which a counterclaim has been based on the contract clause, and
could not have been asserted as a set-off under the pre-1947 law. The possibility
that a defendant in an action for wrongful death might have a counterclaim based
on an unrelated contract seems remote.
43 Section 2523.40 (11624). Defendant to pay costs. "... If a defendant
omits to set up a counterclaim he cannot recover costs against the plaintiff in any
subsequent action thereon."
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If a defendant in a wrongful death action should fail to assert his
cause of action for personal injuries as a counterclaim, and should file
an independent action for his personal injuries against the personal repre-
sentative in the same court, it is not entirely clear that the court has
power to order the two actions consolidated. The consolidation statute,
Section 2309.64,"4 makes the right to consolidation depend upon whether
"cthe actions could have been joined." This language may be broad
enough to include the assertion of a counterclaim. If such a separate
action is filed and if the two actions are never consolidated, a judgment
in one action will not have the effect of res judicata on the other;
Amended House Bill No. 80 does not change this principle.
The effect of Amended House Bill No. 80 upon the use of counter-
claims in actions by personal representatives for wrongful death and
personal injuries will be discussed by the use of illustrations based upon
the following hypothetical set of facts:
Richard Roe held a note against John Smith, in the
amount of $1,000.00. Roe also recovered a judgment against
Smith in the Supreme Court of New York, in the amount of
$2,500.00. There was no connection between the note and
the judgment. By a strange coincidence, 45 while Roe and Smith
were operating their respective automobiles, a collision occurred
in which both Roe and Smith were injured, and in which both
automobiles were damaged. Several weeks later, Smith died as
a result of the collision. His widow was appointed as his
executrix.
Illustration 1. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's personal injuries. Roe may assert as a counterclaim his cause or
causes of action for personal injuries, or for property damage, or both.
This was the law prior to 1955,46 and Section 2309.16 now explicitly
so provides.
Illustration 2. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's wrongful death. Roe may assert as a counterclaim his cause of
action for personal injuries, or for property damage, or both. Section
2309.16 now explicitly so provides. In this respect the law as established
by Epinger v. Wade,4" has been changed by Amended House Bill No. 80.
Illustration 3. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe in
which she joins a cause of action for Smith's wrongful death with a
cause of action for his personal injuries, as she is now permitted to do.
Roe may assert as a counterclaim his cause of action for personal injuries,
or for property damage, or both. Section 2309.16 now explicitly so
provides.
44 Supra, note 27.
45 Such a coincidence is most likely to occur in a detective story or a law
school examination question.
46 See note 40, supra.
47 Supra, note 14.
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Illustration 4. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's wrongful death. Roe may not assert as a counterclaim his cause
of action upon the $1,000.00 note which he held against Smith, because
the phrase "or arising out of contract" is not employed in the new third
paragraph of Section 2309.16."8 The problem is not likely to arise.
Illustration 5. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's personal injuries. Roe probably may not assert as a counterclaim
his cause of action upon the $1,000.00 note which he held against Smith,
because the phrase "or arising out of contract" is not employed in the
third paragraph of Section 2309.16. Prior to the enactment of Amended
House Bill No. 80, Roe could have asserted such a cause of action as a
counterclaim, because of the phrase "or arising out of contract" in the
first paragraph of Section 2309.16. Thus, in this one respect, Amended
House Bill No. 80 restricts the scope of counterclaims. The problem is
not likely to arise.
Illustration 6. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's wrongful death. Roe may assert as a counterclaim his cause of
action upon the $2,500.00 New York judgment against Smith, because
of the phrase "or ascertained by the decision of a court, in the third
paragraph of Section 2309.16. The problem is not likely to arise.
Illustration 7. Assume for this illustration only that the foregoing
hypothetical state of facts is changed to the extent that Roe also died
some weeks after the collision, and that an administrator was appointed
for his estate. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe's administrator
for Smith's wrongful death. Roe's administrator may probably assert as
a counterclaim a cause of action for Roe's wrongful death. The third
paragraph of Section 2309.16 does not explicitly so provide, but this
result would seem to follow from its provisions.
The preceding illustrations have shown the scope of permissible
counterclaims under the 1955 amendment. The following illustrations
will show the operation of the 1955 amendment with respect to evidence,
verdicts and judgments. The illustrations are based on the same hypo-
thetical fact situation.
Illustration 8. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's wrongful death. Roe counterclaims for his personal injuries.
At the trial, Roe may testify as to the wrongful death cause of
action in plaintiff's petition, but not as to the personal injuries cause of
action set forth in his cross-petition, because of the Dead Man Statute.4"
If Roe testifies, the jury should be instructed to consider his testimony
only as to the wrongful death cause of action in plaintiff's petition.50
48 See note 42 and accompanying text, supra.
49 See text accompanying note 10, supra.
GO In Barber v. Kihlken, Admr., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 599 (1934), rev'd on other
grounds, 129 Ohio St. 485, 196 N.E. 164 (1935), the automobiles of Barber and
Schmardebeck collided. Barber was seriouslW injured and Schmardebeck was
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A statement by Smith might be admissible as a declaration against
interest on the wrongful death cause of action, or as an admission on
Roe's personal injuries counterclaim, or both.5 1
Ordinarily, the jury will either (a) return a verdict in favor of
Smith's executrix on her petition, and against Roe on his cross-petition, or
(b) return a verdict against Smith's executrix on her petition, and in
favor of Roe on his cross-petition, or (c) return a verdict against Smith's
executrix on her petition, and against Roe on his cross-petition. Even if
the evidence as to negligence is the same on both the petition and the
cross-petition, it is possible that a jury might improperly return a verdict
in favor of Smith's executrix on her petition and a verdict in favor of
Roe on his cross-petition. Such a possibility seems no more likely in this
situation than in any other collision case in which a cross-petition is filed. 2
If a jury should return such inconsistent verdicts, it would appear to be
the duty of the court not to accept them, and to require the jury to
deliberate further.53
If the jury follows course (b), that is, returns a verdict against
Smith's executrix on her petition, and in favor of Roe on his cross-petition,
and if judgment is entered on the verdict, the judgment on the petition
killed. Barber brought an action for personal injuries against Kihiken, as adminis-
trator of Schmardebeck's estate. The administrator filed a cross-petition for
wrongful death. Apparently no objection was made to the cross-petition. During
the trial the defendant dismissed his cross petition. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Quoting from the oppinion of
the court of appeals:
"The trial court refused to permit the plaintiff Barber to testify except to
facts which occurred after the death of the decedent in accordance with the
provisions of §11495, GC [now §2317.03, Ohio Rev. Code.] This section contains
the provision that 'nothing in this section shall apply to actions for causing death.'
The contention of plaintiff in error is that by reason of the fact that the defendant
filed a cross-petition for wrongful death, there was a waiver of the 'incompetency'
of the plaintiff to testify. It will be observed that §11495, GC, does not make a
party an incompetent witness but merely contains provisions which forbid him to
testify except as to certain matters. Of course, if the cause had been submitted
upon the issues made on the cross-petition, then the testimony of the plaintiff would
have been competent on those issues; but even then it would" have been the duty
of the trial judge to instruct the jury not to consider the testimony of the Plaintiff
upon the issues made on the petition. In view of the fact that the cross-petition was
dismissed, the court properly refused to permit the plaintiff to testify to any
transactions which occurred prior to the decedent's death and by proceeding into
the trial without dismissing the cross-petition the defendant did not waive his
right to object to the plaintiff's testifying." (Italics added.)
51 See text accompanying notes 12 and 13, supra.
52 The possibility of such inconsistent verdicts may be reduced by the sub-
mission of appropriate forms of verdict to the jury.
53 Cf. Miller v. Scott, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 308, 117 N.E. 2d 179 (1952).
There would be no way to prevent the rendition of such inconsistent verdicts
if Roe were to assert his cause of action in an independent action, as he was
required to do under the former law. A judgment in one action is not res judicata
in the other. See text accompanying note 7, supra.
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF dCTION
is against Smith's executrix in her capacity as representative of the
widow and next of kin, while the money judgment on Roe's cross-petition
is against Smith's executrix in her capacity as representative of the estate
of her decedent, and is payable out of Smith's estate in the same manner
as any other judgment against his estate. It does not impose liability on
Smith's widow and children.
Illustration 9. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's wrongful death. Roe counterclaims on the $2,500.00 New York
judgment. The jury returns a verdict for $10,000.00 in favor of Smith's
executrix on her petition, and a verdict for $2,500.00 in favor of Roe on
his cross-petition. The verdicts are not inconsistent, and judgment may
properly be entered in favor of the executrix for the full amount of
$10,000.00, and in favor of Roe for the full amount of $2,500.00. The
two judgments are independent of each other. If Roe satisfies the wrong-
ful death judgment, the $10,000.00 will be distributed directly to Smith's
widow and next of kin; it is not an asset of Smith's estate. The $2,500.00
judgment on the cross-petition is against Smith's executrix in her capacity
as representative of Smith's estate, and is payable out of his estate in the
same manner as any other judgment against his estate. It does not impose
liability on Smith's widow and children.
Illustration 10. Smith's executrix files an action against Roe for
Smith's personal injuries. Roe counterclaims on the $2,500.00 New York
judgment. The jury returns a verdict for $10,000.00 in favor of the
executrix on her petition, and a verdict for $2,500.00 in favor of Roe
on his cross-petition. Since the respective verdicts are in favor of and
against the executrix in the same capacity, that is, in her capacity as
representative of Smith's estate, the $2,500.00 verdict should be sub-
tracted from the $10,000.00 verdict, and judgment rendered in favor
of the executrix against Roe for the balance, $7,500.00. The $7,500.00
judgment is an asset of Smith's estate.
EFFECT OF COUNTERCLAIM PROVISION UPON UTILIZATION OF
JOINDER PROVISION
It is possible that the amendment of the counterclaim statute,
Section 2309.16, will tend to cause a personal representative to join the
causes of action for personal injuries and wrongful death, as he is now
permitted to do, rather than to file separate actions. Under the law
prior to 1955, a personal representative might choose to file separate
actions, for the reason that in the wrongful death action, the defendant
could not counterclaim for his personal injuries. Since the 1955 counter-
claim amendment, however, this reason for filing separate actions does not
exist; the defendant may assert his counterclaim for his own personal
injuries to the same extent, whether the personal representative (1) files
an action for personal injuries, or (2) files an action for wrongful death,
or (3) files one action in which he joins a cause of action for personal
injuries and acause of action for wrongful death.
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CONCLUSION
Amended House Bill No. 80 makes possible an improvement in
judicial administration in Ohio. Although some increase in the complexity
of trials may resul, this is the price which must be paid for reducing the
number of lawsuits. Furthermore, the problems presented by the 1955
legislation do not appear to be unduly difficult.
